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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 920142-CA

v.

:

Priority No. 11

WADE WAGSTAFF,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying
defendant's motion to suppress in the First Judicial District
Court in and for Cache County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Gordon J. Low, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear

the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) & (f) (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the trial court properly conclude that there is no
requirement under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510(1) (1990) that the
evidence with which a defendant allegedly tampered be admissible
at trial for other purposes in order for a prosecution on
tampering with evidence charges to go forward?

When reviewing a

trial court's interpretation of statutory law, Utah appellate
courts apply a correction of error standard and accord no
deference to the trial court.

Ward v, Richfield City, 798 P.2d

757, 759 (Utah 1990); State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah
App. 1991).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The applicable constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules for a determination of this case are as follows:
Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-510. Tampering with evidence.
A person commits a felony of the second degree if,
believing that an official proceeding or investigation
is pending or about to be instituted, he:
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes
anything with a purpose to impair its verity or
availability in the proceeding or investigation; or
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything which he
knows to be false with a purpose to deceive a public
servant who is or may be engaged in a proceeding or
investigation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with tampering with evidence, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510
(1990), and unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992) (R. 3). The information was amended to
add a third charge, interference with an arresting officer, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305
(Supp. 1992) (R. 1-2).
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence and to
dismiss the charges against him (R. 37-67).

At the hearing that

was held on defendant's motion, the State argued that under the
evidence tampering statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1990),
there is no requirement that the evidence forming the basis of
the charge be the product of a legal seizure (Transcript of
Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress dated February 20,
1992, at 5-6 [hereinafter "Tr."]). Consequently, the State
2

agreed to stipulate for purposes of the motion, with respect to
the charge of tampering with evidence only, that the evidence was
illegally seized.

The State further indicated to the trial court

that if the court agreed with the State's interpretation of the
statute and denied defendant's motion with respect to the
evidence tampering charge, the State would move to dismiss the
two misdemeanor charges with prejudice (Tr. 17-18).
Under these circumstances, the trial court had to
resolve a single legal question: Is there any requirement under §
76-8-510 that the evidence with which a defendant allegedly
tampered be admissible at a trial for other purposes in order for
a prosecution on tampering with evidence charges to go forward?
Following the hearing, the court issued a memorandum decision (R.
134-36).

In its decision, the trial court explained that

resolution of the "issue may turn on the definition of evidence.
Evidence to be admitted into the trial is in fact not evidence
until it is received.

On the other hand[,] evidence under

Section 76-8-510, U.C.A., is actually defined as 'anything' which
may be used in a proceeding or investigation" (R. 135).
After discussing various policy considerations that
supported its interpretation of the provision, the trial court
concluded that the statute did not require that evidence be
admissible for other purposes in order for a tampering with
evidence charge to proceed.

On that basis alone, the trial court

denied defendant's motion to suppress with respect to the charge
of tampering with evidence.

It indicated that the balance of the
3

motion would still be addressable as to the two misdemeanor
counts, but noted that the State had previously stated that it
would dismiss those charges (R. 134-35).
The State prepared the appropriate order and moved to
dismiss the remaining charges against defendant.

Defendant

petitioned for permission to appeal from an interlocutory order,
and this Court granted defendant's petition (R. 128-33, 144).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Given the nature of the issue presented in this
interlocutory appeal, and the procedural facts provided in the
Statement of the Case section of this brief, there is no reason
to recite the facts of this case in detail. Moreover, given the
trial court's decision to resolve defendant's motion to suppress
based solely on the question of statutory interpretation, there
is a paucity of facts in the record.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly interpreted Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-8-510 (1990).

Nothing in the plain language of the statute

requires that the evidence with which one is accused of tampering
be evidence that would otherwise be admissible at trial.

Indeed,

the plain language of § 76-8-510(1) prohibits the alteration,
destruction, concealment or removal of "anything with a purpose
to impair its verity or availability in the proceeding or
investigation" (emphasis added).

The trial court properly

construed the term "anything" according to its common meaning,
and applied the statute in keeping with its plain language.
4

Moreover, defendant's assertion that the term
"anything," as used in the statute, "must be construed as
'anything which might be used by the state as evidence,'" is
unsupported by legislative intent.

Br. of Appellant at 9.

A

review of the statute's legislative history indicates that it is
based on a virtually identical provision of the Model Penal Code.
The commentary accompanying the Model Penal Code provision makes
clear that a person may be prosecuted for tampering with
evidence, regardless of whether that evidence would be admissible
at a trial.
The trial court correctly interpreted the plain
language of the statute, and its interpretation is in accord with
the legislative intent underlying the provision.

This Court

should therefore uphold the trial court's interpretation of § 768-510 and affirm its denial of defendant's motion to suppress.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-8-510
ALLOWS FOR THE PROSECUTION OF A TAMPERING
WITH EVIDENCE CHARGE EVEN IF THE MATERIAL
WITH WHICH DEFENDANT ALLEGEDLY TAMPERED IS
DEEMED INADMISSIBLE FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
The trial court properly focused its interpretation of
S 76-8-510 on the plain language of the provision and correctly
interpreted that language.
It is well established that where statutory language is
plain and unambiguous, Utah courts construe the statute according
to its plain language.

See, e.g., Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779
5

P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989); State v. Baashaw, 180 Utah Adv. Rep.
31, 32 (Utah App. February 14, 1992).

Moreover, when

interpreting a statute, Utah courts "generally assume each term
of the statute should, if possible, be given an interpretation
that is in accord with the commonly accepted meanings of its
words."

Hector, Inc. v. United Savings and Loan Association, 741

P.2d 542, 546 (Utah 1987) (citations omitted).
The language of Utah's evidence tampering statute is
plain and unambiguous:
A person commits a felony of the second degree if,
believing that an official proceeding or investigation
is pending or about to be instituted, he:
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes
anything with a purpose to impair its verity or
availability in the proceeding or investigation[.]
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510(1) (1990) (emphasis added).
Nothing in the plain language of the statute suggests
that admissibility of the evidence for other purposes is a
prerequisite to the prosecution of an evidence tampering charge.
Rather, as the trial court recognized, the statute prohibits
tampering with "anything" that may be used in an investigation or
proceeding, regardless of its admissibility.
The trial court properly construed the term "anything"
in keeping with its commonly accepted meaning.

In so doing, the

trial court refused to insinuate a technical and legalistic
definition where the legislature elected to use non-legalistic,
common terminology.

In short, the trial court applied § 76-8-

510(1) in keeping with its plain language based on fundamental
principles of statutory construction and interpretation.
6

On that

basis alone this Court should uphold the trial court's ruling.
Should this Court nevertheless decide to consider the
legislative intent underlying § 76-8-510(1)f an examination of
the statute's legislative history provides additional support for
the trial court's interpretation of the provision.
POINT II
A REVIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OP S 768-510 DEMONSTRATES THAT THE LEGISLATURE
INTENDED TO PROHIBIT TAMPERING WITH ANY
EVIDENCE, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE EVIDENCE
WOULD BE ADMISSIBLE FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
If this Court decides that the language of § 76-8-510
is not plain and unambiguous, then it should "try to discover the
underlying intent of the legislature, guided by the meaning and
purpose of the statute as a whole and the legislative history."
Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah 1990)
(citations omitted).

A review of the statute's legislative

history demonstrates that the trial court correctly divined the
legislative intent underlying § 76-8-510.
Section 76-8-510 was enacted in 1973 as part of a bill
sponsored by Senator Darwin C. Hansen. When debating the bill on
the House floor, Senator Hansen explained that its provisions
were based on the Model Penal Code.1

The evidence tampering

provision of the Model Penal Code reads as follows:
A person commits a misdemeanor if, believing that
an official proceeding or investigation is pending or
1

Utah State House of Representatives, 318 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, 40th general session, 47th day of the Utah State
Legislature, 3rd reading of H.B. 162, February 23, 1973,
Audiograph #224, lines 7-9.
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about to be instituted, he:
(a) alters, destroys, conceals, or removes any
record, document or thing with purpose to impair its
verity or availability in such proceeding or
investigation; or
(b) makes, presents, or uses any record, document
or thing knowing it to be false and with purpose to
mislead a public servant who is or may be engaged in
such proceeding or investigation.
Model Penal Code § 241.7 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
The language of Utah's evidence tampering statute is
very similar to that of the Model Penal Code, with two notable
differences.

First, the Utah provision replaces the phrase "any

record, document or thing" with the single term "anything."
Second, while the model penal code classifies evidence tampering
as a misdemeanor, § 76-8-510 categorizes evidence tampering as a
second degree felony.2

These two differences suggest that the

Utah Legislature intended to prohibit an expansive range of
conduct and impose more harsh penalties than those called for
under the Model Penal Code.

Consequently, an understanding of

M.P.C. § 241.7 must play a central role in the interpretation of
§ 76-8-510.
The commentary accompanying § 241.7 makes clear that
admissibility of the evidence for other purposes is not a
2

The Utah Legislature is not alone in its decision to
provide for a more stringent penalty for evidence tampering than
that called for by the Model Penal Code. Indeed, the legislative
history of § 76-8-510 indicates not only that it was based on the
Model Penal Code, but that the enhanced penalty was likely
prompted by similar action by the New Hampshire Legislature. See
Martin, Utah Criminal Code Outline, at 211 (1973) (identifying
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 641.6 (1955) as the source for § 76-8510). The New Hampshire statute and M.P.C. § 241.7 are virtually
identical except that the New Hampshire statute classifies
evidence tampering as a class B felony instead of a misdemeanor.
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requirement for an evidence tampering charge.

The commentary, in

pertinent part, reads as follows:
Avoidance of the word "evidence" indicates
that liability for tampering does not depend
on the admissibility at trial of the document
or object involved. The question of
admissibility is too elusive to serve as a
determinant of liability for tampering.
Evidence may be admissible for one purpose
but not for another, allowable against one
defendant but excludable by another, crucial
to one charge but irrelevant to another.
Thus, the issue of admissibility may not be
subject to authoritative resolution in a
hypothetical context. More importantly,
evidence not admissible at trial may play a
helpful and perfectly legitimate role in an
investigation. It may lead to evidence that
will be allowed at trial. Thus, restricting
the tampering offense to actions that
preclude the use or undermine the integrity
of admissible evidence would be inconsistent
with the essential rationale of preventing
and punishing obstruction of justice.
Virtually every revised code proscribes
tampering with evidence without regard to its
admissibility at trial, and a few statutes
make explicit provision to that effect.
Model Penal Code § 241.7, comments on section, at 179-80
(Proposed Official Draft 1962) (footnotes omitted).
The Model Penal Code commentary supports the trial
court's determination that § 76-8-510 does not require that the
evidence with which defendant tampered be admissible at trial for
other purposes.

Had the legislature intended otherwise, it could

have expressed its dissatisfaction with the Model Penal Code
commentary.3
3

Cf. 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on
the Fourth Amendment, § 11.4(j) at 459-60 (2d ed. 1987)
("[IJncriminating admissions and attempts to dispose of
(continued..
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To summarize briefly, both the plain language of § 768-510 and the legislative history of the statute demonstrate that
admissibility of the evidence at trial for other purposes is not
a prerequisite for the prosecution of an evidence tampering
charge.

Based on this narrow issue, the trial court properly

denied defendant's motion to suppress with respect to the
evidence tampering charge.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
uphold the trial court's ruling and affirm its interlocutory
order denying defendant's motion to suppress.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £*^

day of September,

1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
TODD A. UTZtfNGE&
Assistant Attorney General

3

(...continued)
incriminating evidence are common and predictable consequences of
illegal arrests and searches, and thus to admit such evidence
would encourage such Fourth Amendment violations in future
cases.").
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